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MORALITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
POSITIVISM
ALAN D. CULLISON*
In recent years we've seen a lot of public controversy about basic
social policy. The disputants often try to get their positions cast into
law-requiring this, or forbidding the requirement of that, and so on.
In these situations it's tempting to appeal to the "nature" of law for
help. Maybe an opponent's proposal is so bad that it couldn't be law,
or be legal, or be obligatory.
The so-called "natural law" theories can be used in this kind of
argument. They include moral standards that law has to meet in order
to qualify as True Law. A proposal that flunks the morals test won't
be binding, even if it's enacted. (But the trouble is, natural law theories
tend to be controversial themselves, so they're not all that much help
in a policy dispute. They often only add fuel to the controversy rather
than helping to resolve it.)
Legal positivism doesn't have controversial moral standards. It
uses an objective, empirical standard only: A rule is law, without
regard to its goodness or badness, if it's enacted in the proper way
by the proper law-making authority. So an argument based on the
"nature" of positivist's law will have a solid empirical foundation. But
the argument won't go very far in a policy dispute because there's
no screening out of rules that are foolish or immoral. Solid as it is,
an empirical standard just isn't a very potent weapon for shooting
down an opponent in a policy dispute.
There's another side to this difference between natural law and
positivist theories. Natural law theories can say there's a moral obliga-
tion to obey the law, since all rules have to pass a morals test in
order to be True Law. Legal positivism, on the other hand, is hard
put to explain how there could be any kind of obligation to obey the
law without regard to its possible wickedness.
Professor MacCormick offers us the best of both worlds. We get
the solid empirical moorings of legal positivism. We also get a moral
standard that restricts the permissible moral content of law. Although
it's a standard for legal argument rather than for the validity of law,
it still lets us score points in some policy disputes. What's more, the
moral standard rests in part on the very foundations of positivism,
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making it more solid than a detached moral argument would be.
Finally, we get something akin to a moral obligation to obey the law
(even though valid law can be immoral).
How does Professor MacCormick pull this off? By tinkering with
the foundations of positivism. Legal positivism depends on a moral
principle of the sovereignty of conscience, he says. And accordingly,
the fundamental positivist thesis has to be qualified to reflect this
underlying moral principle.
The view I'm going to stake out and defend here is legal
positivism in its most conservative and conventional form. Legal
positivism has empirical foundations and doesn't rest on any moral
principle (such as the sovereignty of conscience). And it's neither
necessary nor desirable to qualify the foundations of positivism in
order to make moral arguments about what the law should be. Such
moral arguments can (and should) be made, of course, and it's only
proper that they take cognizance of the nature of law. But they have
to stand on their own feet, separate and detached from the positivist
theory of what the law is.
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
The main virtue of legal positivism is that it tries to describe
law as a social institution. It's a theory (or a group of related theories)
in the same sense as other descriptive theories of other social institu-
tions. That is, it contains a good measure of conceptualizing and
guesswork; but it aspires to explain hard, observable facts as simply
as possible, and its proponents must be ready to change their con-
cepts and speculations when more successful ones come along.
One of the central features (and surely the most interesting
feature) of legal positivism is the notion we were discussing earlier
that law is a body of rules that can be identified objectively. This
is a strong assertion. It says (in principle, at least) that I can go into
any human society and discover what counts as law in that society
and what doesn't. In testing for a rule's legal status I'd look mainly
to its pedigree-where it came from, who promulgated or adopted
it and how. I wouldn't necessarily need to concern myself with the
rule's content or its goodness. The exact details of the tests I used
would depend on the legal system involved, but the theory asserts
that the tests would in any case be objective and ultimately empirical.
My disagreement with Professor MacCormick concerns the
reasons for not having a morals test in addition to the empirical stan-
dard just described. So let's stand back a bit and look at the positivist
theory from a broader perspective. I want to make three points which,
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taken together, explain why legal positivism defines law with an em-
pirical standard but without any added moral standards.
1. The Descriptive Purpose
My first (and main) point is that positivism, being a descriptive
theory, has to confine itself as much as possible to objective
phenomena and concepts that help describe them. By Ockham's razor,
we should go for the simplest theory that fits the facts. Extra moral
standards are too problematic to include when they can be avoided-
they're too controversial, too hard to coordinate usefully with actual
behavior.
It's normal, even characteristic, for a modern descriptive theory
to exclude from its province subject matter that doesn't contribute
tangibly to the descriptive purpose. Chemistry and alchemy used to
be indistinguishable, they say; but when science became more rigorous-
ly empirical the science of chemistry emerged with the unruly sub-
ject of alchemy defined out. A descriptive theory succeeds in part
by excluding material from its province that's problematic and unessen-
tial in advancing the descriptive purpose.
It's not that moral ideas are inherently unfit for a descriptive
theory. They can be dealt with when necessary. As positivists are
fond of pointing out, there's plenty of morality associated with law
at various levels, and this can be described. A moral principle could
even be adopted as law if the proper law-making authority made it
so. But, once it's adopted, we'd look upon such a principle mainly as
law rather than as morality, just as we look upon nuclear chemistry
(by which some elements are transformed into others) as being
chemistry rather than alchemy.
2. The Universality of Law
My second point is that, since legal positivism tries to describe
a universal social institution, its concept of law has to reflect the
shared concepts of people from all sorts of societies. Moral standards
won't work for the general concept of "law" if they're at all
controversial.
If everyone agreed on some moral standard as an essential in-
gredient of law, that would allow (indeed, require) positivists to incor-
porate it into their concept. Very possibly there are such shared stan-
dards. But to count they have to be empirically demonstrable. (And,
once demonstrated, they'd seem trivial precisely because they're so
widely shared. This isn't the kind of moral principle that cuts to the
heart of a policy dispute.)
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A particular society might have a moral standard that's accepted
as an added requirement for legal status in that society. But if other
societies don't buy into the project, we can't include it in the unitary
concept of "law." Rather, we'd view the standard as part of the local
law (part of the pedigree test-a secondary rule, ultimately supported
by the rule of recognition) for that particular society; so it wouldn't
be an "added" standard after all.
3. Law-Making And the Management of Controversy
My third point about why the positivist concept of law doesn't
have a morals test asserts something about how people actually use
law. The point is that one important function law serves in many
societies (such as our own) is to remove morality from legal disputes.
One of the many insights contained in Professor MacCormick's
paper is his observation that law-makers generally settle disputes at
a practical level and leave underlying moral issues unsettled.' Yet they
cast their rules in the morally resonant vocabulary of guilt and in-
nocence, duty and breach, right and remedy, and so on, as though
they were concluding the moral issues they avoid.2
Lawyers are familiar with the effect this has on the terms of
later disputes. When law is applied, the controversy focuses on the
narrow "legal" issues defined by the rules being applied. The rules
steer us away from the larger, expansive issues of good and evil and
leave us to decide a case in terms of issues the law-makers have
chosen, terms that often seem nit-picky and confining. But that's the
point: the legal system has co-opted the moral dimensions of the
dispute without resolving the moral issues.
Of course rules could be promulgated to steer us into the juicy
issues of naked Truth and Justice, but this is rarely done in fact.
Law is used to manage and contain controversy. What the law-maker
leaves for the law-applier to decide (and the litigants to argue about)
is severely limited and largely de-moralized.
To summarize: The last two points, taken together, show how
legal positivism, as a descriptive theory, sorts out moral issues accord-
ing to their level of controversiality. (The controversiality of an idea
is itself a social fact that the descriptive theory has to reflect.) If a
moral idea is universally shared, it can be included in the theory's
1. MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law? (Seegers Lecture
March 1985) 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1985).
2. Id.
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global concept of "law." If the idea is shared within a particular society,
it can be included in the description of the local law for that society.
But if there's controversy within a society and the authorized law-
makers don't resolve it, then the moral idea just isn't a valid and
binding part of law.
But what if we "know" (for whatever reasons) that some moral
idea is Right and True, even though the lesser lights who run and
live in the various legal systems don't agree? Shouldn't we include
this Truth as a tenet of our theory despite its controversiality? This
is the first (and main) point: Not if our theory is a descriptive theory
of social phenomena. Such a normative idea might be useful in criticiz-
ing law; but to have a role in identifying law, it has to contribute
tangibly to our theory's descriptive purpose. Ockham's razor lops it
off. Thus it is that legal positivism, as an empirical, descriptive theory,
doesn't include any added moral standards for legal validity.
HART'S POSITIVISM
I need to tie H.L.A. Hart's theory more specifically into my
scenario because it figures in the premises of Professor MacCormick's
argument.
Professor Hart's concept of law was formulated as a descriptive
theory. His aim was to understand social phenomena, and to clarify
the general framework of legal thought rather than to criticize law
and legal policy The standard he adopted for legal validity was
objective- ultimately an empirical, though complex, question of fact.4
He took up the issue, pressed by natural-law types, of adding
a morals test that would invalidate some rules even when the society
involved considered them valid. He offered two reasons for sticking
with the broader, empirical concept of law (broader in that it doesn't
exclude rules on moral grounds). His first reason (which I've been
building up to in my scenario) was based on his scientific, descriptive
purpose:
It seems clear that nothing is gained in the theoretical or
scientific study of law as a social phenomenon by adopting
the narrower [natural-law type] concept: it would lead us
to exclude certain rules even though they exhibit all the
other complex characteristics of law. Nothing, surely, but
3. H.L.A. Hart, CONCEPT OF LAW vi (1961).
4. Id. at 245, n.1.
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confusion could follow from a proposal to leave the study
of such rules to another discipline, and certainly no history
or other form of legal study has found it profitable to do
this. If we adopt the wider concept we can accommodate
within it the study of whatever special features morally in-
iquitous laws have, and the reaction of society to them.
Hence, the use of the narrower concept here must inevitably
split, in a confusing way, our effort to understand both the
development and potentialities of the specific method of
social control to be seen in a system of primary and secon-
dary rules.'
This is Hart's way of putting the first point I made earlier: It would
not advance, and would even impede, the descriptive purpose of his
theory to complicate it with extra concepts that are introduced for
a different purpose.
Professor MacCormick rejects this first reason out of hand. I'll
deal with that matter presently.
Hart's second reason argues that, on moral or policy grounds,
the concept of law shouldn't include extra moral standards: Even if
we could educate people to change the concept they hold, the positivist
concept would still be the better concept for them to hold because
it clarifies the moral issues involved in resisting an abuse of power.'
Having rejected the first reason, Professor MacCormick pursues this
second one, which he takes to be "an argument for the final
sovereignty of conscience, and how to best preserve it."
7
This second reason is, to MacCormick, the only reason not to
have the morals test. Thus he concludes that legal positivism depends
on a moral position (the sovereignty of conscience reflected in Hart's
second reason), that the positivist thesis must be qualified to reflect
5. Id. at 204-05.
6. Id. at 205-06. The point is, roughly, this: You can better see your moral
duty to disobey a wicked rule that purports to be "law" if you understand that laws
can be wicked.
7. MacCormick, supra note 1, at 10. This is because Hart's second reason
assumes that people, as individual moral agents, have to decide for themselves what
laws are too immoral to obey.
8. Professor MacCormick evidently anticipates that some positivists will favor
a purely descriptive version of positivism. See id. at 10-11. Accordingly, many of his
assertions are carefully guarded and qualified, as though his thesis were only tentative.
See, e.g., id. at 11 ("our argument (or a fundamental part of our argument)... is moral";
the "best case" for the positivistic limb "at least includes" moral argument); Id. at 18
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My view is that legal positivism can stand on its own empirical
feet, that it doesn't require or depend on moral justification. The
sovereignty of conscience is an attractive idea, to be sure, and
positivists are free to espouse it. But you do not have to espouse it
in order to be a positivist. Hart's first reason alone is a sound and
sufficient justification for not adding a morals test to his definition
of law.
So back to Hart's first reason. Here's why Professor MacCormick
rejects it:
The first [reason], which seems an extremely weak one, is
that no intellectual or scholarly purpose could be served
by expelling from the province of jurisprudence and legal
studies those rules which governmental agencies impose and
implement as "laws" even though they lacked the moral
quality of justifiability which natural law would stipulate
as essential to true legality. The fact, however, is that no
such exclusion from the discipline of legal study need take
place. Such rules could and should be studied as purported
but pathological specimens of "law," and the grounds for
their exclusion from the true category could and should be
expounded and addressed within the discipline of law, even
if a natural lawyer's criteria of legality were adopted.'
What MacCormick rejects here isn't really Hart's first reason.
Hart didn't say there's no "intellectual or scholarly purpose" in
the moral standards of natural law theories. Rather, there's no scien-
tific or descriptive purpose in using them to identify law. He wasn't
trying to define the entire field of jurisprudence, but only the descrip-
tion of law as a social phenomenon. He objected to the expulsion of
bad rules from the concept of "law" that provided the central focus
of his descriptive theory.
An extra normative standard that eliminates bad rules wouldn't
have any scientific purpose, and would only confuse things. This is
(difficulties with the disestablishment thesis "may prove communicable" to the positivist
thesis); Id. at 18 (sovereignty of conscience "may have a major role to play" in justify-
ing both theses).
However, other assertions are less equivocal. E.g., id. at 28 (point of view "which
justifies adopting the positivist approach"); Id. at 29-30 (postitivism "depends on a point
of view" by which law must always have some moral value); Id. at 30 (positivist limb
"now stands accordingly qualified").
9. MacCormick, supra note 1, at 9; see also N. MacCormick, H.L.A. HART
159-60 (1981); J. Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 357-59 (1980).
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essentially the same reason Copernicus had in removing the earth
from the center of the universe. That concept didn't add to his scien-
tific purpose, and it even confused things by requiring a lot of fancy
footwork with epicycles in order to explain the hard facts. There were
normative reasons to keep the earth in the center, but that's not
enough.
So, in my view, Hart's first reason for rejecting the moral stan-
dards is entirely sufficient. Positivism doesn't depend on a moral prin-
ciple of the sovereignty of conscience. If there are further reasons,
grounded in moral argument, not to have a morals test, that's fine.
But let's not tinker with the theory just so we can make the moral
argument stronger.
THE QUALIFICATION
How much tinkering does Professor MacCormick want to do? His
qualification on the positivist thesis may seem very mild, especially
in comparison with the havoc a natural lawyer type would wreak.
It's simply this: Laws ought never to be presumed to be morally justified
or morally binding upon the ground of their formal validity alone."
If positivism were qualified by including this proposition as one of
its tenets, the argument against a natural-law type morals test would
be strengthened. Maybe we positivists should just accept the qualifica-
tion, cut our losses, and be happy to have a stronger defense against
the natural lawyers.
This qualification is quite easy to accept for some meanings of
"ought." There's nothing in the descriptive positivist theory to sug-
gest that a valid law is morally justified or binding;" indeed, the theory
admits the possibility that a law might be immoral. So moral justifica-
tion or bindingness "ought" not be presumed in the sense that there's
simply no basis for such a presumption. For this sense of "ought,"
the qualification isn't really a qualification at all.
However, when MacCormick says "ought," he's also thinking of
the sovereignty of conscience: It would violate that affirmative moral
principle to make the presumption. Indeed, the qualification is derived
from that moral principle, which he sees as necessary for the justifica-
tion of the positivist theory. I can't buy the qualification if he packs
all of that into the word "ought." We shouldn't qualify the descrip-
tive theory to accommodate a purely normative concept.
10. MacCormick, supra note 1, at 30.
11. That is, not unless it's imported through some added concept like Kelsen's
grundnorm. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY
If there's no morals test for law, and evil rules can be valid law,
then what in the world does it mean to say law is binding? What's
a legal obligation? People everywhere think of law as being obligatory,
and that's a hard fact that positivists have to take into account.
However, positivists haven't always agreed on how to do the
accounting.
The strongest position a positivist can take here is to say there's
a moral obligation to obey the law. Kelson took such a view; it came
packaged with his controversial basic norm."2 But the transempirical
basic norm is hard for a true-blue descriptive theorist to swallow if
there's another way to explain the social facts.
Possibly there "is" no obligation to follow the law in any purely
objective and universal sense. Even so, as Hart taught us, we can
elucidate the concept if, along with the hard external facts, we consider
the internal viewpoint of law. Don't simply ask what a legal obligation
"is"; ask what statements using the concept mean. An assertion like
"you are bound to do what the law provides," is a conclusion based
on a legal system that the speaker accepts. The author of such an
assertion, by accepting the rules of the legal system, takes the inter-
nal viewpoint of law. A descriptive theorist doesn't himself have to
assume that viewpoint (and hold that the law "is" binding). But he
has to take it into account if he wants to fully describe the social
institution of law.
There's a hint of evasiveness in Hart's elucidation. It's a bit like
saying "an obligation is something that a person who thinks you're
obligated says you have." But if we can't find, beyond this, any objec-
tive basis for saying there "is" an obligation to obey, then we'll have
to settle for Hart's elucidation alone.
Professor MacCormick offers something better, something addi-
tional. There's some moral value in any valid law, he says, even an
evil law from a wicked ruler. The mere fact of validity gives it some
claim (if only minimal) on our attention as moral agents. There "is"
an obligation to obey, though it's only hypothetical in the sense that
it's inconclusive; it leaves open the question of moral (categorical)
obligation.' 3
12. Kelsen's presupposed basic norm makes it obligatory to follow what the
framers of a constitution provide. So the constitution, and hence also any laws adopted
pursuant to it, are binding. To Kelsen, there "is," in this presupposed way, an obliga-
tion to obey any valid law. H. Kelson, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115-16
(1949).
13. MacCormick, supra note 1, at 39-40.
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My main problem with MacCormick's argument (as usual) is that
it's based partly on the moral viewpoint he sees lurking in the foun-
dations of positivism. Even so, he has independent arguments, not
based on that premise, pointing toward a moral value for all law. Any
rule that has enough social and political support to be enacted in a
truly functioning legal system may indeed have some minimum moral
value to go along with its legal validity. It's an appealing thesis. But
it should stand on its own as a descriptive assertion, and other
theorists (even other positivists) may disagree about how to
characterize the moral issues and moral values.
CONCLUSION
Professor MacCormick is a positivist of the first rank. He suf-
fers the abuses inflicted on all notable theorists, which is to be sniped
at from all directions by all sorts of people. The snipers come out
of the woodwork to take a potshot or two, and then retreat. Here's
one sniper who'd like to tip his hat before retreating.
MacCormick's arguments are powerful, yet intricately crafted.
This is partly because they do have to stand up to rigorous criticism
from all jurisprudential viewpoints. He's proposing significant changes
in the jurisprudential landscape. He'd like legal positivism to occupy
a larger part of the total field of jurisprudence than its purely descrip-
tive versions can claim-to contribute directly to some normative
issues about what the law should be. This would reclaim for positivists
some of the moral territory once held by the utilitarians. It's a large
and impressive undertaking.
My own view: Legal positivism (including Hart's version) is main-
ly a description of social phenomena. It stands without need of extra-
empirical moral justification (that being just frosting on the cake). So
when Professor MacCormick throws out Hart's first reason for
avoiding a morals test, he's throwing out (I'd say) the main point. He
ends up in the very awkward position (for positivists) that positivism
must stand or fall on Hart's second, moral ground.
My position is, perhaps, old fashioned, and it's rather hopeless
for people who want to appeal to the nature of law in support of their
arguments on controversial issues of social policy. But you can't
describe your way into an answer to policy issues about what the
law should be.
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